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Recent Decisions
ERISA-WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN-GARNISHMENT STATUTES-PRE-
EMPTION-The United States Supreme Court has held that a state
garnishment statute which makes explicit reference to ERISA cov-
ered benefit plans is preempted by ERISA, but that a state's gar-
nishment procedure which permits the garnishment of a partici-
pant's benefits in an ERISA welfare benefit plan is not preempted
by ERISA.
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
2182 (1988).
John H. Mackey (Mackey) and others were trustees of an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan as defined by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 The welfare benefit plan
provided annual vacation and holiday benefits to eligible employ-
ees located in several southeastern states.2 Lanier Collections
Agency & Service, Inc. (Lanier) was a collection agency.' Twenty-
three participants of the welfare plan administered by Mackey
owed money to clients of Lanier.' Lanier obtained money judg-
ments against the plan participants and instituted a garnishment
action in a Georgia trial court to collect the money judgments by
garnishing the debtors' plan benefits.' "The trial court granted the
garnishment request" and Mackey appealed the decision. 6 The
Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under a Georgia
statute, section 18-4-22.1, 7 which barred the garnishment of funds
1. Mackey, v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2184 (1988).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1982).




6. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at A-21).
7. GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program sub-
ject to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
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or benefits of an employee benefit plan subject to ERISA, the wel-
fare plan benefits were exempt from garnishment.8
Lanier appealed and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals, concluding that ERISA
preempted the Georgia statute "since it purports to regulate gar-
nishment of ERISA funds and benefits, a matter specifically pro-
vided for" in the federal statute.9 After analyzing the preemption
provisions of ERISA, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that
the federal statute did not bar garnishment of employee welfare
plan benefits, 10 but did protect employee pension plan benefits11
from garnishment or alienation. 12 The court found that the Geor-
gia statute regulating ERISA covered plans, section 18-4-22.1,13
was "in conflict with" the federal scheme, as the state law prohib-
ited that which ERISA permitted; therefore, the state law was pre-
empted by ERISA. 14 The Georgia Supreme Court, however, held
that the welfare benefit plan administered by Mackey was subject
to garnishment under the state's general garnishment law.
15
"Because of conflicting decisions among the courts on the" issues
presented, the United States Supreme Court on July 28, 1987,
granted Mackey's petition for certiorari.16 In a 5-4 decision,17 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court.
18
The Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the ques-
1974, as amended, shall not be subject to the process of garnishment . . . unless such
garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support.
Id.
8. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 178 Ga. App. 467, 343 S.E.2d
492, 494 (1986).
9. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc. v. Mackey, 256 Ga. 499, 501, 350 S.E.2d
439, 442 (1986).
10. Welfare benefit plans provide health, legal, vacation or training benefits. See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1982).
11. Pension benefit plans provide retirement income. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i)
(1982).
12. 256 Ga. at 501, 350 S.E.2d at 442.
13. See supra note 7.
14. 256 Ga. at 501, 350 S.E.2d at 442.
15. Id. See GA. COD)E ANN. § 18-4-20 et seq. (1982).
16. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
17. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. 108 S. Ct. at 2184-91. Justice Kennedy
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Id. at
2191-94. The United States appeared amicus curiae by special leave of the Court. Id. at
2184.
18. Id. at 2184-85.
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tion of whether the Georgia statute, section 18-4-22.1,19 regulating
ERISA covered benefit plans conflicted with the federal scheme
and therefore was subject to preemption by ERISA. s° Section
514(a) of ERISA provides for preemption of any state law insofar
as it "relates to" plans covered within the purview of ERISA.2'
Justice White pointed out that in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,22
the Supreme Court stated that "a law 'relates to' an employee ben-
efit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan. '28 The Mackey Court noted prior
case law which had established "that state laws which make 'refer-
ence to' ERISA plan are laws that 'relate to' those plans within the
meaning of section 514(a)." '24 The majority concluded that as the
Georgia statute explicitly referred to ERISA employee benefit
plans, the state law was subject to preemption under section
514(a).25
19. See supra note 7.
20. 108 S. Ct. at 2185.
21. Id. ERISA § 514(a) provides that: "[T]he provisions of this subchapter and sub-
chapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .. " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
22. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). The issue presented in Shaw was whether ERISA preempted a
New York Human Rights Law that prohibited discrimination in employee benefit plans on
the basis of pregnancy, and the State's Disability Benefits Law, requiring employers to pay
sick leave benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy. Id. at 88. The Su-
preme Court had no difficulty in finding that § 514(a) of ERISA preempted the New York
laws on the basis that the laws related to employee benefit plans within the meaning of the
preemption provision. Id. at 96.
23. 108 S. Ct. at 2185 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).
24. Id. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987). The issue presented
in Pilot Life was whether ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract actions
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit
plan. Id. at 1550-51. The Supreme Court held that ERISA does preempt the state lawsuit
asserting improper processing of claims for benefits under an ERISA regulated plan where
the state common-law cause of action does not regulate insurance within the meaning of the
savings clause in the ERISA preemption provision. Id. at 1558.
See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). The issue
presented in Metropolitan Life was whether ERISA preempts state mandated benefit laws,
which are laws that require group health insurance policies to include coverage for certain
specified health care needs. Id. at 727. The Supreme Court held that the mandated benefit
laws were laws regulating insurance and fell within the savings clause exception, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (1982), to ERISA preemption. Id. at 744.
25. 108 S. Ct. at 2185. The Supreme Court rejected the Georgia Court of Appeals' view
that § 18-4-22.1 was saved from preemption because it might have been enacted to help
effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes. Emphasizing that legislative "good intentions" are
not sufficient to save a state law from preemption, the Supreme Court reiterated its position
in Metropolitan Life that § 514(a) displaces all state laws that fall within its sphere, includ-
ing those that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. Therefore, the Su-
preme Court held that § 18-4-22.1 was preempted under § 514(a) of ERISA. 108 S. Ct. at
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Justice White next addressed the question of whether Georgia's
general garnishment statute, section 18-4-20,26 which did not spe-
cifically mention ERISA plans of any kind, was preempted by
ERISA.2 Mackey asserted that the Georgia general garnishment
law "related to" the welfare benefit plans and therefore was pre-
empted by ERISA under section 514(a).28 Specifically, compliance
with a garnishment order involved and affected the plan and its
trustees by requiring additional administrative tasks.29 Since
"ERISA itself' contained "no express answer as to whether welfare
benefit plan trustees" were required to "comply with garnishment
orders," the Supreme Court refuted Mackey's contentions by ana-
lyzing related ERISA provisions and the statute's structure.3 0
ERISA welfare benefit plans may sue or be sued under section
50231 in several types of civil actions.32 Section 502 allows law suits
2185.
26. See supra note 12.
27. 108 S. Ct at 2185. The Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on whether §
514(a) of ERISA preempted general garnishment laws in Franchise Tax Bd. of California v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 7, 26 n.30 (1983).
28. 108 S. Ct. at 2186. Although "Georgia's general garnishment statute does not sin-
gle out or specially mention ERISA plans of any kind," the Supreme Court stated that "as
we have recognized, the preemptive force of section 514(a) is not limited to such state laws."
Id. (citing Pilot Life and Shaw).
29. Id.
30. Id. The Supreme Court joined the "virtually unanimous view of federal and state
courts" and held that federal law does not bar a garnishment action like Lanier's. Id. See,
e.g., Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (9th
Cir. 1986); Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pensions Trust
Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 368-70 (D. Ariz. 1987); Local Union 212, Int'l Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212, Int'l Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Credit Union, 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1300-02 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd per curiam,
735 F.2d 1010, 1011 (6th Cir. 1984); First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Latiker, 432 So. 2d
293, 296 (La. App. 1983); Electrical Workers Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d (Mo. 1979).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982). The "sue and be sued" clause of ERISA, § 502, provides
in pertinent part:
(a) . ..
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan .. .
(d) ..
(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity
2) Any money judgment won under this subchapter against an employee benefit plan
shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity . ..
Id.
32. 108 S. Ct. at 2186.
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against an ERISA plan for specific relief and performance.83 The
Supreme Court stated that section 502 "clearly contemplates the
enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans 34 and run
of the mill claims against the plan.3 5 ERISA, however, does not
provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting money judg-
ments won in a civil action. 6 Therefore, the majority concluded
that "state-law methods for collecting money judgments" should
remain intact since there was no other "way to enforce such a judg-
ment won against an ERISA plan."3 The Supreme Court reasoned
that since ERISA did not prohibit attachment of ERISA plans'
funds, such attachments could not "relate to" an ERISA plan;
therefore, Lanier's proposed garnishment order also would not "re-
late to" ERISA.3 Thus, garnishment was one permissible method
for collecting money judgments won in state or federal court
against ERISA welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal
law.39
Mackey claimed 0 that under the language of section 514(a), gar-
nishment to collect judgments won by creditors of the plan was
permissible, but garnishment to collect judgments obtained by
creditors of the plan's participants was impermissible.' 1 The Su-
preme Court determined that such a distinction was not supported
by the language of section 514(a).2 Conversely, the Court noted
33. Id. at 2186-87.
34. Id. at 2187 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) (1982)).
35. The Supreme Court noted that "lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill
state-law claims ... [were] relatively commonplace." Id. Mackey and the United States
Solicitor General conceded that run-of-the-mill type suits are not preempted under § 514(a),
"although obviously affecting and involving ERISA plans and their trustees." Id. (citing Tr.
of Oral Arg. at 6, 11-12, 15).
36. Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a), which defers to state law to provide methods for
collecting judgments.
37. 108 S. Ct. at 2187.
38. Id. The Supreme Court stated that "if attachment of ERISA plan funds does not
'relate to' an ERISA plan in any of these circumstances, we do not see how [Lanier's] pro-
posed garnishment order would do so." Id.
39. Id. Mackey's brief argued "that any garnishment of an ERISA plan was pre-
empted;" however, the Supreme Court noted that under questioning at oral argument,
Mackey "conceded that garnishment is among the state-law enforcement mechanisms that
may be used in certain types of cases involving ERISA welfare benefit plans." Id. at 2187-88
(emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 2188. The argument that ERISA law precluded garnishment by the creditor
of a plan participant was also presented by the United States Solicitor General. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Section 514(a) preempts state laws "insofar as they ... 'relate to'. em-
ployee benefit plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
stated that "there is simply no logical way to construe the English language so that garnish-
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that Congress had expressly precluded enforcement of state law
judgments against certain ERISA plans.'" For example, section
206(d)(1)"' bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan bene-
fits, although Congress did not offer similar protection to welfare
plan benefits, like those administered by Mackey.1s
Justice White found the provisions of section 206(d)(1) impor-
tant to the present case in two respects. "' First, section 206(d)(1)
prohibits the alienation of pension plan benefits."7 In contrast, sec-
tion 514(a) concerns state laws that control plans.48 Mackey and
the Solicitor General wanted the Supreme Court to interpret sec-
tion 514(a) "as protecting only benefits, but not plans as a whole
from state-law attachment orders."' 9 Justice White reasoned that
Congress, by passing section 206(d)(1), showed that Congress could
"stay the operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not
plans," if Congress wished to do so50 The Supreme Court refused
to accept the Solicitor General's request to imply such a limitation
on section 514(a) when Congress made the limitation express in
section 206(d)(1). 1
Second, Justice White concluded that if the court adopted the
view of Mackey and the Solicitor General, that section 514(a)
barred the garnishment of both pension and welfare plan benefits,
the result would be to render section 206(d)(1) redundant with sec-
tion 514(a).2 The majority reasoned that when Congress enacted
ERISA it chose to adopt a provision barring the alienation or gar-
nishment of ERISA pension benefit plans and chose not to impose
ment or attachment laws 'relate to' benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the
beneficiaries, but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan] it-
self." Id. (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below at 24.)
43. Id.
44. ERISA § 206(d)(1) provides that "[elach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
45. 108 S. Ct. at 2188 (emphasis in original).
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis in original). Justice White stated that this prohibition prevented
"the use of state enforcement mechanisms only in so far as they prevent those benefits from
being paid to plan participants." Id. at 2188-89.
48. Id. at 2189 (emphasis in original). See supra note 42.
49. 108 S. Ct. at 2189.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Supreme Court found no "basis for construing [ERISA] in this manner
and . . . in light of [section] 206(d)(1), [rejected] the Solicitor General's suggested interpre-
tation of [section] 514(a)." Id.
52. Id. Justice White noted that based on prior case law, the Supreme Court was
"hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous
another portion of that same law." Id.
788 Vol. 27:783
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that limitation on ERISA welfare benefit plans.5 3 Since Congress,
through its adoption of section 206(d)(1), was aware that ERISA
plan benefits could be attached or garnished, the Supreme Court
determined that congressional silence concerning the attachment
or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits acknowledged and
accepted, rather than prohibited, the practice of garnishing welfare
plan benefits."4 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded "that
Congress did not intend" to preempt "state-law attachment of
ERISA welfare plan benefits.
'5 5
The Supreme Court also rejected Mackey's and the Solicitor
General's argument that amendments made to ERISA by the Re-
tirement Equity Act of 198456 were evidence of Congress' intent
that section 514(a) generally preempted state attachment and gar-
nishment procedures.5 7 Mackey and the Solicitor General con-
tended that the 1984 amendment to section 514(a) made it clear
that section 514(a), as originally enacted, generally preempted
state attachment and garnishment procedures. 8 Mackey and the
Solicitor General argued that otherwise, there would not have been
any reason "to amend section 514(a) to save domestic relation or-
ders from preemption." '59 Justice White, however, interpreted Con-
gress' intentions in passing the 1984 amendments as correcting an
53. Id. (emphasis in original). Justice White stated that "[iun a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are significant ones." Id. Cf. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985).
54. 108 S. Ct. at 2189 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 516
(1981)).
55. Id.
56. Act of August 23, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 1426. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. III); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 &
Supp. III). The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amendments to ERISA insured that the
statute's antigarnishment and preemption provisions could not be used to block the enforce-
ment of "qualified domestic relations orders" (QDROs). Generally, QDROs are court orders
providing for child support and alimony payments by ERISA plan participants. 108 S. Ct. at
2190. The 1984 amendment to § 514(a) was reflected in § 514(b)(7), which states that
"[slubsection (a) shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders (within the meaning
of § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title)." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. III).
57. 108 S. Ct. at 2189-90. The Supreme Court noted that:
While the primary focus of this portion of the 1984 Act was removing [section]
206(d)(1)'s antigarnishment protection from pension plan benefits when spouses
sought enforcement of domestic support orders, Congress at the same time also
amended [section] 514(a)'s preemption provision. It apparently adopted the latter
amendments in response to lower court rulings that had interpreted [section] 514(a)
to bar state-law garnishment for the purpose of enforcing domestic relations orders.
Id. at 2190.
58. Id. at 2190.
59. Id.
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error made by some courts in construing section 514(a) as pre-
empting domestic relation orders."
From the majority's perspective, the 1984 amendments clarified
the original meaning of section 514(a), and corrected a judicial
misinterpretation. 1 Justice White reasoned that even if Congress
in 1984 believed that section 514(a) was enacted with the intent
that it would preempt domestic relations orders, congressional
opinion in 1984, as to the meaning of ERISA when it was enacted
in 1974, did not control the issue.6 2 The Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one." 3 The majority reasoned
that it was the intent of the Congress that originally enacted the
law that was controlling and the Court had to look at the language
and structure of ERISA to determine congressional intent in 1974,
when ERISA was first enacted. 4 Therefore, the Supreme Court
held that section 514(a) did "not forbid garnishment of an ERISA
welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose [was] to collect judg-
ments against plan participants.
6 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy6 agreed with the ma-
jority that ERISA preempted section 18-4-22.1, but disagreed that
section 514 of ERISA did not also prohibit a state general garnish-
ment law from attaching participants' funds in ERISA welfare
benefit plans.6 7 Justice Kennedy concluded that the majority's
holding was inconsistent with both ERISA and Supreme Court
precedents.6 8 Justice Kennedy concluded that the phrase "relate
to" in section 514(a) must be "given its broad common sense
meaning," and asserted that if a state law made reference to or has
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1403-04 (1988); United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 218
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
62. Id. (citing United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977)).
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
64. Id. at 2191. The Supreme Court also refused to consider the 1984 House Commit-
tee Report relevant to congressional intent in 1974. The Report stated that: "[T]he Commit-
tee reasserts that a state tax levy on employee welfare benefit plans is preempted by
ERISA." The Supreme Court stated that "this statement does suggest that the House Com-
mittee in 1984 thought that [section] 514(a) foreclosed state-law attachment orders akin to
those at issue here. But again, these views, absent an amendment to the original language of
the section, do not direct our resolution of this case." Id.
65. Id.






a connection with a benefit plan, such state law "relates to" that
plan "in the normal sense of the phrase."69 Justice Kennedy ex-
pressed the view that state garnishment laws related to employee
benefit plans and were preempted because the effects of such gar-
nishment laws on benefit plans were not "tenuous, remote, or pe-
ripheral. '70 The garnishment procedures required the plans to act
as garnishees, thereby forcing the plan trustees to undertake sub-
stantial administrative burdens in order to comply with a garnish-
ment order.71
Justice Kennedy also rejected the majority's view that the 1984
amendments to ERISA, which Congress effectuated with passage
of the Retirement Equity Act, only corrected a perceived judicial
error and clarified the original meaning of section 514(a) not to
preempt state garnishment procedures. 72 In the opposite view, the
dissent concluded that, in deciding to exempt certain garnishment
procedures for the collection of child support and alimony from
the preemptive reach of ERISA, Congress clearly manifested its in-
tent to save only a limited class of garnishment orders from pre-
emption.73 Justice Kennedy stated that "[s]urely Congress knew
that similar questions concerning the validity of garnishment pro-
cedures would arise in other contexts." 4 The dissent concluded
that Congress' decision to enact only a limited exception to the
preemption provision of ERISA was a "carefully calibrated legisla-
tive choice" which was being rendered inconsequential by the ma-
69. Id. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (1987); Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
70. Id. at 2192 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
71. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that in order for Mackey to comply with the state gar-
nishment order he and the other trustees of the welfare benefit plan are:
[R]equired to confirm the identity of each of the 23 plan participants who owe money
to [Lanier], calculate the participant's maximum entitlement from the fund for the
period between the service date and the reply date of the summons of garnishment,
determine the amount that each participant owes to [Lanier] and the participant's
entitlement. [Mackey] must also make decisions concerning the validity and priority
of garnishments and, if necessary, bear the costs of litigating these issues. Further, as
trustees of a multiemployer plan covering participants in several States, [Mackey and
the other trustees] are potentially subject to multiple garnishment orders under vary-
ing or conflicting state laws.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The dissent reasoned that the limited scope of the exception, exempting do-
mestic relation orders from preemption, created a strong structural implication. Id.
74. Id. Justice Kennedy stated: "Congress decided to save from pre-emption only a
limited class of garnishment orders, and then only upon specifically prescribed conditions."
Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. III).
1989
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jority's view that garnishment of welfare plan benefits were not
barred by ERISA16
The dissent adopted the position that the majority was incorrect
to dismiss the views of Congress in 1984 on the ground that the
views of a subsequent Congress should not be the basis for deter-
mining the intent of an earlier Congresss.7  Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that the congressional views the majority was rejecting were
a "positive expression of legislative will" which the Supreme Court
was "bound to give effect."'7 The dissent reasoned further that in
amending section 514(a) in 1984, Congress clearly outlined the cir-
cumstances under which welfare benefit plans must comply with
state garnishment orders of employee plan benefitss.7  Therefore,
Congress manifested its intent through section 514(a) to prohibit
the garnishment of funds due to participants in ERISA welfare
benefit plans.
7 e
Disputing that the issue in the case was not "whether garnish-
ment may be used to enforce a valid judgment obtained against an
ERISA plan," Justice Kennedy asserted that the issue was whether
creditors of the plan's participants and beneficiaries could force
their employer's ERISA plan "to act as a garnishee."80 The dissent
distinguished between garnishment proceedings where an ERISA
plan is the debtor and where the plan is a garnishee.$' In the situa-
tion where the employer is forced into the role of a garnishee, Jus-
tice Kennedy concluded that the majority's view that state gar-
nishment laws are never preempted was too broad and
unwarranted. s Where a plan is a garnishee, it is required to under-
take the costs of monitoring hundreds of plan participants' and
beneficiaries' controversies in several states, placing significant
burdens on the plan."3
Disagreeing with the majority that the sue and be sued clause of
ERISA, section 502, allows enforcement of garnishment orders
75. 108 S. Ct. at 2192.
76. Id. (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). See supra notes 62-64.
77. 108 S. Ct. at 2192.
78. Id. See supra note 56.
79. 108 S. Ct. at 2192.
80. Id. at 2193 (emphasis in original). The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning
that since ERISA did not "provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments
won" in a civil suit against an ERISA plan pursuant to § 502, "Congress must have intended







pursuant to state law, the dissent regarded cases relied on by the
majority 4 that discussed sue-and-be-sued clauses as a waiver of
sovereign immunity that enabled federal agencies to be sued just
as a private or commercial enterprise might be sued.85 In the
ERISA context, however, the dissent concluded that the states'
ability to treat employee benefit plans as they might treat any
commercial enterprise was substantively limited by section 514.86
The dissent reasoned that the majority's view, that an interpre-
tation of section 514(a) as only protecting benefits and not plans
from garnishment would render section 206(d)(1) redundant with
section 514(a), was not weighty in the present context for two rea-
sons. 7 First, Justice Kennedy stated that the "alternative con-
struction adopted by the majority results in the total redundancy
of section 514(b)(7)."88 The dissent favored a partial overlap of
section 514(a) and section 206(d)(1) to avoid the total redundancy
of section 514(b)(7).89 Second, Justice Kennedy concluded that
many state laws would be preempted even in the absence of the
deliberate and expansive scope of section 514 based solely on the
conflict between such laws and ERISA's substantive require-
ments.90 The dissent reasoned that Congress chose an approach to
preemption that resulted in foreseeable overlap, which was neces-
sary to further the purpose for which section 514 was enacted.9'
84. Id. at 2187 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. USPS, 467 U.S. 512 (1984);
FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245-46 (1940)).
85. Id. at 2193. The dissent determined that the sue and be sued clause in Franchise
Tax Board and FHA "was a waiver of the sovereign immunity that otherwise would have
protected certain federal agencies from legal process, including writs of garnishment." Id.
Justice Kennedy stated that "in that context, it was perfectly sensible to 'presum[e] that
when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it
with authority to 'sue or be sued,' that agency is no less amenable to judicial process than a
private enterprise under like circumstances would be." Id. (citing FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S.
242, 245 (1940)).
86. Id. The dissent noted that the Supreme Court's "cases finding several state-law
causes of action pre-empted establish" at the very least that § 514 "substantively limits the
States' ability to treat employee benefit plans as they may treat any commercial enterprise."
Id. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987) (holding that certain con-
tract and tort laws, though otherwise generally applicable, may not be invoked against an
employee benefit plan); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103-06 (1985) (finding
certain fair employment laws preempted)).
87. Id.
88. Id. Section 514(b)(7) affects § 514(a) and states that "[slubsection (a) shall not
apply to qualified domestic relations orders (within the meaning of section 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)
of this title)." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. III).
89. 108 S. Ct. at 2193.
90. Id. at 2194.
91. Id. The dissent reasoned that "[slome degree of overlap [was] a necessary concom-
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Therefore, the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the Trustees of the ERISA welfare benefit plans must comply
with the state garnishment orders.9 2
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was
enacted in 1974 as a result of the rapid and substantial growth of
private pension and benefit plans and the states' inability to de-
velop a comprehensive and uniform governing body of law."
ERISA was designed to provide for the general welfare, well-being
and security of employees and their beneficiaries through federal
regulation of employee benefit plans.9" One of the policies ex-
pressed in ERISA is to establish standards of conduct, responsibil-
ity and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans in order
to protect the interests of participants in such plans.s ERISA also
provides appropriate remedies for plan participants and ready ac-
cess to federal courts to obtain redress for violations of ERISA's
established standards.9
To provide for the federal regulation of the pension and welfare
benefit plans and eliminate conflicts with state regulation, a gen-
eral preemption rule was set forth in section 514(a). 7 According to
itant of the approach to pre-emption chosen by Congress." Justice Kennedy stated that
"[the partial redundancy which the Court strives to avoid is essentially analogous to a host
of like overlaps that Congress must have foreseen. To suggest that this type of overlap is
sufficient to call into question the applicability of [section] 514 is to defeat the very purpose
for which it was enacted." Id.
92. Id.
93. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1982). ERISA is divided
into four titles. Title I establishes minimum standards regulating the content of pension
plans with respect to participation, benefit accrual, reporting and disclosure and funding. 29
U.S.C. § 1001-1145 (1982). Section 502 of Title I enables a participant, beneficiary, or fiduci-
ary to bring a civil action in federal court to enforce the terms of an employee benefit plan
or the provisions of Title I. Id. § 1132.
94. Id. § 1001 (1982).
95. Section 1001(b) states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy . . . to protect.
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans ... by establishing standards of con-
duct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by provid-
ing appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the Federal courts." Id. § 1001(b).
96. Id.
97. Section 514(a) states that:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of the subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
4(a) of this title and not exempt under section 4(b) of this title. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1982).
For the purposes of section 514 the "term State law includes all laws, decisions, rules,
regulation, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C. §
1144(c) (1982).
The "term state includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or
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the legislative history, section 514 was intended to have a very
broad reach. 8 The Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare, Senator Williams, commented that, except in limited
circumstances, section 514 would "preempt the field for Federal
regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsis-
tent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This
principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of
State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which
have the force or effect of law." 99 Representative Dent, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education
Committee, stated that section 514 is the "reservation to Federal
authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee ben-
efit plans."'1 0 Senator Javits, ranking minority member of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, stated: "[I]t is also in-
tended that a body of federal substantive law will be developed by
the courts to deal with issues involving rights under private welfare
and pension plans."' 0 '
Section 514 does provide for some exceptions to absolute pre-
emption. The savings clause, section 514(b)(2)(A), enables the
states to continue to regulate the conduct of banks, insurance com-
panies and securities markets without interference from the pre-
emption provisions of ERISA.102 The deemer clause, section
514(b)(2)(B), limits the savings clause by restricting the scope of
what constitutes regulation of insurance.1
0 3
In 1984 Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act'0 (REA)
for the purpose of amending ERISA "to improve the delivery of
retirement benefits and provide for greater equity under private
instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms
and conditions of employee benefit plans covered . by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(c) (1982).
Id. § 1144(a).
98. 120 CONG. REC. 29,917, 29,933, 29,942 (1974).
99. Id. at 29,933.
100. Id. at 29,917.
101. Id. at 29,942.
102. Section 514(b)(2)(A) provides that preemption shall not "exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
103. Section 514(b)(2)(B) provides that no employee benefit plans covered by ERISA
nor any trust established under such a plan "shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business
of insurance or banking for purposes of any state purporting to regulate" those entities. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).




pension plans" for employees, spouses and dependents by consid-
ering such factors as changing work patterns, the status of mar-
riage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution
made by spouses to that partnership. 05 To accomplish this pur-
pose, REA amended the spend thrift provision of ERISA, section
206(d), 0 and created a limited exception which permits the appli-
cation of state law in some family property cases, thereby allowing
a spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent of a plan partici-
pant to collect a participant's benefits as an alternate payee." 7
To collect plan benefits, an alternative payee must obtain a
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).'0 8 A QDRO is defined
as a domestic relations order made pursuant to a state domestic
relations law relating to child support, alimony, or family property
rights of spouses, former spouses, and children.0 9 According to the
House and Senate reports, clarification of the spendthrift rules was
necessary because of a "divergence of opinion among the courts as
to whether ERISA preempts State community property laws" re-
lating to the rights a married couple might have to benefits under
a pension, profit sharing, or stock bonus plan." 0 In order to permit
105. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2547.
106. Section 206(d), assignment or alienation of plan benefits, provides that "[elach
pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III).
107. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2565-67. The Senate Report also noted that if a plan did not contain a
spendthrift provision, it was not a qualified plan under the Internal Revenue Code and that
state laws permitting the assignment or alienation of plan benefits were preempted by §
514(a). Id. at 2564.
108. Section 206(d)(3) provides:
Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any
benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order,
except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits
in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations
order.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(b)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. III).
109. Section 206(d)(3)(B)(ii) provides:
The term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order (including
approval of a property settlement) which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community prop-
erty law).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III).
110. H.R. REP. No. 655 Part 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984); S. REP. No. 575, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2565.
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the application of state domestic relations laws to an ERISA quali-
fied employee benefit plan, REA amended section 514(a) by adding
section 514(b)(7), which provides that ERISA's preemption provi-
sions do not apply to qualified domestic relations orders. 11 The
Senate report stated that conforming changes to ERISA section
514 were "necessary to ensure that only those orders that are ex-
cepted from the spendthrift provisions are not preempted by
ERISA.
,112
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
preemption of state law under the substantive aspects of ERISA in
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan.11s This case dealt with whether
employers could offset pension benefits by amounts of workers'
compensation awards for which retirees were eligible.114 The em-
ployer's practice of reducing pension benefits by the amount of
workers' compensation awards received by the retirees was in con-
flict with a provision of the New Jersey Workers' Compensation
Act which prohibited such offsets.' 5 The private pension plans in
which the retirees were participants were subject to federal regula-
tion under ERISA.'16
The Supreme Court held that the New Jersey law was pre-
empted by ERISA insofar as the state law eliminated a method for
calculating pension benefits under ERISA governed plans.1"7 The
majority reasoned that Congress "meant to establish pension plan
regulation as exclusively a federal concern" through the explicit
language of section 514(a)." 8 However, the Court noted that in or-
der for the preemption provision to apply, the New Jersey law had
to be deemed a state law that related to an employee benefit
111. Section 514(b)(7) provides that "[s]ubsection (a) shall not apply to qualified do-
mestic relations orders (within the meaning of section 206(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title)." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. III).
112. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2565.
113. 451 U.S. 504 (1981). Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
all other Justices joined. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 526.
114. Id. at 507.
115. Id. at 507-08. The pertinent provision of the New Jersey statute provided that
"[t]he right of compensation granted by [the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act] may
be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against
employees' retirement pension benefits or payments." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West
Supp. 1980).
116. 451 U.S. at 507.
117. Id. at 525. The Court stated that "ERISA's authors clearly meant to preclude the
States from avoiding through form the substance of the preemption provision." Id.
118. Id. at 523.
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plan. 119 Although the New Jersey law was within the state's police
power by regulating workers' compensation awards and not pen-
sion plans, the majority concluded that the New Jersey statute re-
lated to pension plans governed by ERISA because the statute
eliminated the federally permitted method of integration for calcu-
lating pension benefits.120 The majority reasoned that ERISA per-
mits integration of pension funds with other public income for the
purpose of calculating benefits and that the New Jersey law ban-
ning pension benefit offsets based on workers' compensation
awards was in direct conflict with the federal calculation
method.121 Although the New Jersey law encroached indirectly,
"rather than directly," on pension plans through the worker's com-
pensation law, the Supreme Court found that the language of
ERISA section 514(c)(2) made it clear that an intrusion upon an
"area of exclusive federal concern" may occur through indirect
state action. 2 '
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,"2 s the issue was whether ERISA
preempted a New York Human Rights Law that prohibited dis-
crimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy
and the State's Disability Benefits Law, which required employers
to pay sick leave benefits to employees unable to work because of
pregnancy. 24 Based on the plain language of section 514(a), and
the structure and legislative history of ERISA, a unanimous Court
had "no difficulty" in holding that the New York laws related to
119. Id. The Court noted that the phrase "relates to any employee benefit plan" gives
"rise to some confusion where, as here, it is asserted to apply a state law ostensibly regulat-
ing a matter quite different from pensions." Id. at 523-24. The New Jersey law regulated
workers' compensation awards, not pension plan matters. Id. at 524.
120. Id. at 524. The Court explained that integration was "a calculation practice under
which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams
available to the retired employees." Id. Using the integration method, the total benefit pool
to be distributed to retired employees contains contribution amounts from each income
stream. Monies from other income maintenance programs are integrated with the pension
funds, and "the pension benefit level is determined on the basis of the entire pool of funds."
Id. at 514.
121. Id. at 524-25. The Court noted that it did not have to "determine the outer
bounds of ERISA's preemptive language to find this New Jersey provision an impermissible
intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 525.
122. Id. Section 514(c)(2) defined the term "State" to include "a State, any political
subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1982).
123. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for an unanimous
Court. Id. at 87.
124. Id. at 88.
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employee benefit plans within the meaning of section 514(a). 125
The Supreme Court stated that a "law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan."'2 6 Using this definition, the
Supreme Court found that the New York Human Rights Law and
the Disability Benefits law related to benefit plans in that both
laws placed restrictions on employers as sponsors of employee ben-
efit plans.
2 7
In Shaw, the Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether
the Human Rights Law was exempt from preemption by section
514(d), which provides that section 514(a) shall not "be construed
to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of
the United States.' 128 The New York State Division of Human
Rights argued that preemption of the Human Rights Law would
modify and impair Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because it
would alter Title VII enforcement provisions. 29 The Supreme
Court held that preemption of the Human Rights Law would im-
pair and modify Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights
Law provided a means of enforcing Title VII. 30 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the enforcement scheme to process a benefit
plan discrimination claim under Title VII would be disrupted if
the Court ordered the Human Rights Law preempted by ERISA.1
3
1
Before the passage of ERISA, a complaint submitted to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title
VII was referred to the New York State Division of Human
Rights.1 32 If ERISA were permitted to preempt the Human Rights
Law, the state would no longer be able to prevent the alleged dis-
crimination and the New York Division of Human Rights would no
125. Id. at 96. Section 514(a) requires federal law to preempt all state laws which "re-
late to" any ERISA plan. See supra note 97.
126. 463 U.S. at 96-97.
127. Id. at 97.
128. Id. at 100-01 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982)).
129. Id. at 101. The Court stated that "[sitate laws obviously play a significant role in
the enforcement of Title VII." Id. (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
468-69, 472, 477 (1982); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-65 (1980)).
130. Id. at 102.
131. Id.
132. Id. Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws in § 708, which states:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liabil-
ity, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present o future law of any State
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require
or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2003-7 (1982).
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longer be "authorized to grant relief." 33 Therefore, the EEOC
could no longer refer claims to the New York state agency."3 The
Supreme Court concluded that such a result in the enforcement
process "would frustrate the goal of encouraging joint state/federal
enforcement of Title VII" and would "'modify' and 'impair' fed-
eral law."'35 However, the Supreme Court held that insofar as the
state law prohibited employment practices that were lawful under
Title VII, the Human Rights Law was preempted by ERISA. 136
The Disability Benefits Law was not preempted by ERISA be-
cause under section 514(a) state laws were not preempted even if
they related to employee benefit plans exempt under section
4(b). 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that although a state might
not require an employer to alter its ERISA plan, the employer
might be forced by the state to decide whether to provide disabil-
ity benefits in a separately administered plan or to include the
state-mandated benefits in its ERISA plan.3 8 Therefore, the Disa-
bility Benefits Law was held not preempted by ERISA, although
the state of New York could not enforce its requirements through
regulation which related to an ERISA-covered benefit plan.'39
In a subsequent 1985 case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Massachusetts,'4" the Supreme Court, for the first time,
addressed ERISA's complex "savings" and "deemer" clauses.'"
This case involved a Massachusetts statute'42 requiring that cer-
133. 463 U.S. at 102.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Supreme Court, in a footnote, stated that "[pireemption of this sort not
only would eliminate a forum for resolving disputes that, in certain situations, may be more
convenient than the EEOC, but also would substantially increase the EEOC's workload. The
inevitable result of complete preemption, in short, would be less effective enforcement of
Title VII." Id. at 102 n.23.
136. Id. at 103. The Supreme Court reasoned that "Title VII would prohibit precisely
the same employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner, even if no
State made additional employment practices unlawful. Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on
the subject of all employment practices it does not prohibit." Id.
137. Id. at 106. Section 4(b)(3) exempts from preemption "any employee benefit plan
• . . maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable .. disability insurance
laws." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1982).
138. 463 U.S. at 108.
139. Id. at 109.
140. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which all other Justices joined. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at
726.
141. Id. at 733. For the language of the "savings" clause, see supra note 102, and for
the language of the "deemer" clause, see supra note 103. See also Sherrick, ERISA Preemp-
tion: An Introduction, 64 MICH. B.J. 1074 (1985).
142. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West 1985).
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tain minimum mental-health-care benefits be provided to state
residents insured under either a general health insurance policy or
an employee health-care plan that covered hospital and surgical
expenses. 1, The ERISA issue involved in the case was whether the
state mandated benefit laws were preempted by ERISA under sec-
tion 514(a). 1"
The Supreme Court found that the Massachusetts law clearly re-
lated to ERISA governed welfare plans, thereby falling within the
preemptive reach of section 514(a). 14 15 Relying on Shaw, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the broad scope of section 514(a) and
stated that the "preemption provision was intended to displace all
state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that
are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements."1 6 The
Court also drew upon its opinion in Alessi and stated that "even
indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach
upon the area of exclusive federal concern. ' 147 Although the state
law was not a benefit plan law, the Court found that it bore indi-
rectly, but substantially, on all insured benefit plans since it man-
dated them to purchase certain mental-health benefits specified in
the statute; therefore, the state law related to ERISA plans and
was covered under the broad preemption provision of section
514(a).14
However, the Supreme Court held that the state mandated ben-
efit law was a law regulating insurance, and therefore fell within
the savings clause exception to ERISA preemption under section
514(b)(2)(A).1 49 The Metropolitan Life Court relied on the plain
language of section 514(b)(2)(A), its relationship to the other
ERISA preemption provisions, the traditional understanding of in-
surance regulations, and the legislative history of ERISA to con-
clude that the Massachusetts state law was not preempted, but
preserved, by section 514(b)(2)(A).1 50 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the common sense view that the state law was saved from pre-
emption by the savings clause was reinforced by the language of
143. 471 U.S. at 727.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 739. See supra note 97.
146. 471 U.S. at 739.
147. Id. (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981)).
148. Id. at 739.
149. Id. at 740. Secti(n 514(b)(2)(A) preserves any state law "which regulates insur-
ance, banking or securities" from preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
150. 471 U.S. at 739-47.
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the deemer clause of ERISA.1 51 Discussing congressional intent,
the Supreme Court found that the deemer clause made Congress'
intent explicit that laws that regulate insurance contracts were
within the scope of insurance laws preserved by the savings
clause.15 If congressional intent would have been otherwise, it
would not have been necessary for the deemer clause to explicitly
exempt laws regulating insurance contracts from the savings
clause.1"3
The Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life relied on cases con-
struing the meaning of the phrase "business of insurance" in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 54 to determine that the savings clause en-
compassed regulation regarding the substantive terms of insurance
contracts as laws "which regulate insurance." 5 ' Based on three cri-
teria identified by cases as relevant to determining whether a par-
ticular practice fell within the meaning of "business of insurance,"
the Supreme Court concluded that the Massachusetts state man-
dated benefit laws were state regulation of the "business of
insurance."
1 56
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Pilot Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Dedeaux,1 57 again addressing the language of the "savings"
and "deemer" clauses of ERISA.1 58 The issue in this case was
whether state common law tort and contract actions, asserting im-
proper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured em-
151. Id. at 740. The deemer clause states that an employee benefit plan shall not be
deemed to be an insurance company "for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
152. 471 U.S. at 741.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982). The Act provides that "[t]he business of insur-
ance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a). Congress enacted
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to ensure that the states would continue to have the ability to
tax and regulate the business of insurance. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1979).
155. 471 U.S. at 743 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129
(1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)).
156. Id. The three criteria defining the phrase "business of insurance" are: "first,
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance indus-
try." Id. See supra note 155.
157. 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court. Id. at 1550.
158. Id. at 1553. See supra notes 102-03.
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ployee benefit plan, were preempted by ERISA.6 9 After conclud-
ing that the common law causes of action asserted in this case
related to an employee benefit plan within the meaning of the pre-
emption clause of section 514(a), the Supreme Court then ad-
dressed the question of whether the Mississippi common law of
bad faith was a law "which regulates insurance," thereby being
saved from preemption by section 514(b)(2)(A). 160
Relying on the reasoning and considerations set forth in Metro-
politan Life, the Supreme Court concluded that the Mississippi
common law of bad faith was not a law which regulated insurance
within the meaning of the savings clause. 6' The Supreme Court
reasoned that a common sense understanding of the phrase "regu-
lates insurance" indicated that a law must be specifically directed
toward the insurance industry in order to regulate it.'62 The Mis-
sissippi common law of bad faith was not just directed exclusively
toward the insurance industry because its roots were "firmly
planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract
law;" therefore, it did not fall within the purview of the savings
clause.
163
The McCarran-Ferguson Act'64 factors also did not support the
assertion that the Mississippi common law of bad faith regulated
insurance.6 5 The Pilot Life Court found that the common law
could not be said to effect the spreading of policyholder risk, and
was not limited to entities within the insurance industry, although
it did constitute an integral part of a policy relationship between
the insurer and insured.6 6 Consequently, since the common law
159. 107 S. Ct. at 1550.
160. Id. at 1553. In determining if Dedeaux's common law causes of action "related
to"an employee benefit plan, the Supreme Court relied on Metropolitan Life and Shaw.
The Court stated that "[i]n particular we have emphasized that the preemption clause is
not limited to 'state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.'" Id. (citing
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1985)). The Supreme Court concluded that the
common law causes of action raised in this case "undoubtedly meet the criteria for preemp-
tion under [section] 514(a)." Id.
161. Id. at 1553. The considerations set forth in Metropolitan Life that the Court
cited to determine whether a state law falls under the savings clause were first, a " 'com-
mon-sense view' of the language of the savings clause itself" and second, the Court "made
use of the case law interpreting the phrase 'business of insurance' under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act." Id. See supra notes 140-56.
162. 107 S. Ct. at 1554.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 154-56.
165. 107 S. Ct. at 1554.
166. Id. at 1555. The Supreme Court noted that the Mississippi "common law of bad
faith did not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured,"
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only met one of the three criteria used to identify the "business of
insurance," it did not "regulate insurance" within the meaning of
the savings clause."6 7 Finding that Congress clearly expressed an
intent that the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) be
the exclusive procedure for actions by plan participants and bene-
ficiaries asserting improper processing of claims for benefits under
an ERISA plan, the Supreme Court held that different state causes
of action for claims that were within the scope of section 502(a)
would be in conflict with the "purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."168 Therefore, the Mississippi common law of bad faith was
preempted under section 514(a) of ERISA based on the McCarran-
Ferguson Act factors, the "common sense understanding of the
savings clause" and the exclusive language of section 502(a).169
Although there has been less guidance by ERISA concerning
welfare benefit plans as opposed to pension plans, the courts have
consistently held in the specific area of garnishment of welfare
benefit plan assets that state garnishment laws are not preempted
by section 514(a) of ERISA. In Electrical Workers, Local No. 1
Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund,7 ' a Missouri
state court held that ERISA did not preempt the garnishment of a
holiday fund trust that required each employer to contribute a
portion of its payroll to provide holiday pay benefits for employees,
even if the plan contained a spendthrift clause.17 1 In response to
the Holiday Trust Fund's assertion that Missouri laws governing
garnishment of employee benefit plans were preempted by ERISA,
the state court examined the legislative history. 17 2 The state court
which was "in contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life." Id.
167. Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Court had to look at the impact of
the "savings clause in ERISA as a whole." Id. The Court stated that "[o]n numerous occa-
sions we have noted that '[in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy.' " Id. (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 358 (1986); Offshore Logis-
tics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1986); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 270, 285 (1956); States v. Heirs of Boisdore, - U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)). There-
fore, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative intent regarding the civil enforcement pro-
visions of ERISA, § 502(a). 107 S. Ct. at 1555. See supra note 31.
168. 107 S. Ct. at 1555.
169. Id. at 1558. For the language of § 502(a), see supra note 31.
170. 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979).
171. Id. at 156, 162. Each employer was to contribute an amount equal to 8.5% of
their gross monthly payroll to the holiday fund trust for each plan year. Id. at 156. The
state court concluded that the payments were in the nature of wages or earnings within the
meaning of the Missouri state law, Mo. REv. STAT. § 525.030 (West Supp. 1975). 583 S.W.2d
at 162.
172. 583 S.W.2d at 159.
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concluded that statements made by the legislators concerning the
preemption clause were ambiguous and that the sole purpose of
section 514(a) was to eliminate "the threat of conflicting or incon-
sistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans. ' 173
Section 514(a) was the only bar to the garnishment since section
206(d)(1) of ERISA does not require spendthrift language that
benefits provided under a plan might not be assigned or alienated
if a plan is not a pension benefit plan. 174 However, the Missouri
court refused to apply section 514(a), concluding that an unwar-
ranted "regulatory vacuum" could be the result of such preemp-
tion. 75 The state court reasoned that the enforcement of state
court money judgments by creditors was a valid area of state con-
cern which was totally unregulated by ERISA with respect to wel-
fare plans. 7  The court declined to hold that the Missouri laws
were preempted by ERISA because Congress had not expressed an
intent to regulate in traditional areas of state concern. 77
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio in Local 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW
Credit Union178 reached the same result as the Missouri state
court. 79 A credit union, pursuant to Ohio state law, sought to gar-
nish certain beneficiaries' interest in a vacation trust fund created
in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement.8 0 The court
was presented with the question of whether ERISA prevents a
creditor of an employee from garnishing funds held in a vacation
trust fund for the benefit of the employee.18' The district court
concluded that section 206(d)(1) was expressly limited to pension
plans and declined to hold that it applied to welfare benefit
plans.'8 2 This result, the district court noted, was consistent with
173. Id. The court referred to statements made during the floor debate on ERISA by
Representative John Dent and Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., 120 CONG. REC. 29,933
(1974); 120 CONG. REC. 29,917 (1974).
174. 583 S.W.2d at 157 n.2, 159.
175. Id. at 159.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 549 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd per curiam, 735 F. 2d 1010 (6th Cir.
1984).
179. 549 F. Supp. at 1302.
180. Id. at 1300.
181. Id. This was basically the same issue presented to the United States Supreme
Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
182. Id. at 1301-02. The district court discussed Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S.
1 (1983). The district court adopted the dissent's view in Franchise Tax Bd. that "ERISA's
purposes did not mandate implication of such protection for employee welfare benefit
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the overall preference ERISA affords pension benefits through
statutory protection. 183 The district court found no similar prefer-
ence given to welfare benefit plans in ERISA or in the legislative
history."8' The court reasoned that for section 514(a) to apply, an
express or implied provision of ERISA had to be involved and
none was found here. 185 Doubting that the state garnishment law
related to the vacation trust fund because the fund's administra-
tive expense incurred in processing the garnishment notices was
the only "regulatory" effect the court could identify,8 " the district
court considered this regulatory effect minimal, thereby rendering
it insufficient to invoke ERISA's preemption provision.
187
The only state or federal court decision which has held that
ERISA preempts state-law attachments of welfare benefit plans
was Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers'
Vacation Trust for Southern California,'88 a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion which was later vacated on jurisdictional grounds by the
United States Supreme Court. 89 This case involved an attempt by
the State of California to collect delinquent personal income taxes
from union members by imposing a tax levy against money held in
their union's vacation trust fund. 90 The vacation trust fund was an
employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA and was governed by
a spendthrift clause to protect it from voluntary and involuntary
assignments of plan benefits.' 9' The district court held that the
statutes authorizing the state to collect delinquent personal income
taxes directly from the Vacation Trust did not directly or indi-
rectly regulate employee benefit plans and that such statutes were
"wholly peripheral to the purposes of ERISA."'19 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court and found that the purpose of
ERISA and an implied restriction in the language of the anti-alien-
ation clause of ERISA, section 206(d)(1), required that the same
protection afforded pension plans should be extended to vacation
plans." 549 F. Supp. at 1299.
183. 549 F. Supp. at 1302.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1302.
187. Id.
188. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
189. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
190. 679 F.2d at 1308.
191. Id.
192. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, No. 80-02741-R
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1980).
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trusts. 1 3 The majority concluded that the state failed to identify a
state interest that would warrant ERISA not preempting the state
levy on the Vacation Trust Fund.194 The Ninth Circuit held that
ERISA preempted the state's attempt to collect employees' tax lia-
bilities directly from the vacation trust fund as the fund was enti-
tled to the same protection guaranteed pension plans under section
514(a) as a welfare benefit plan.195
Other decisions from the Ninth Circuit have taken the view of
Judge Tang's dissent in Franchise Tax Board.1 96 Judge Tang rea-
soned that the explicit language of section 206(d)(1) states that
only pension funds are covered under the anti-alienation clause,
and since welfare benefit plans are "strictly distinguished" from
pension plans under ERISA, the vacation trust fund was excluded
from section 206(d)(1) coverage. 197 The dissent asserted that an
anti-alienation restriction could not be implied to apply to em-
ployee welfare benefit plans for several reasons.1 98 First, Congress
took great care in drafting section 206(d)(1) to exclude employee
welfare benefit plans, and consequently, Congress did not intend to
"create an implied anti-alienation restriction."1 99 Second, the legis-
lative history of ERISA revealed no evidence that Congress in-
tended to protect employee welfare benefit plans from garnish-
193. 679 F.2d at 1309. Section 206(d)(1) provides in full: "Each pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1982).
194. 679 F.2d at 1309.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1310-11. See, e.g., Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health & Welfare
Trust, 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986). In holding that ERISA does not forbid assignment by
a beneficiary of his right to reimbursement under a health care plan to a health care pro-
vider, the court relied on the explicit language of § 206(d)(1), which only prohibits assign-
ment of pension benefits and makes no mention of the assignment of employee welfare ben-
efit plan benefits. The court relied further on the purpose of the anti-assignment provision,
which is to ensure that employee's accrued benefits are available for retirement purposes.
Id. at 1376. See also Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension
Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365 (Ariz. 1987). Nevarez involved former spouses who
had obtained judgments against participants in pension plans for failure to make required
alimony and child support payments, and a spouse of a participant who instituted garnish-
ment proceedings against the trust funds. Id. at 366. The court found that the express lan-
guage of ERISA's anti-alienation clause of § 206(d)(1) applies only to pension plans and not
welfare benefit plans, including health and welfare trust fund and vacation and savings trust
fund. Id. at 369. The court found further that ERISA does not preempt state garnishment
of a welfare benefit plan based on congressional intent to only protect pensions plans and
not welfare benefit plans. Id. at 370.
197. 679 F.2d at 1310.
198. Id. at 1310-11.
199. Id. at 1310.
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ment, attachment or levy.20 ° Third, the purposes for which ERISA
was enacted did not mandate implying an anti-alienation restric-
tion covering employee welfare benefit plans. 20 1 Judge Tang con-
cluded that the limited regulation of employee welfare benefit
plans by ERISA, compared with ERISA's heavy regulation of pen-
sion funds, "strongly suggests" that Congress was more concerned
with the loss of plan participants' pension benefits than with the
depletion of their welfare plan benefits.20 2 The dissent opined that
the "loss of one's pension is far more catastrophic than the loss of
funds devoted to financing an annual vacation.
2 0'
In discussing the preemption of the California levying statute
under section 514(a), Judge Tang reasoned that the scope of sec-
tion 514(a) is not unlimited.20 4 By using the word "regulate" in sec-
tion 514, the legislative choice was not to preempt the narrow cate-
gory of state laws that did not relate to employee benefit plans
within the meaning of section 514(a).2 05 In Judge Tang's view, the
state levying statute fell within that "narrow category of state
laws" that only affect employee benefit plans.2 0 6 Employee benefit
plans are subject to federal tax levies; therefore, Judge Tang con-
cluded that processing state tax levies did not impose an addi-
tional or serious administrative burden on the trustees of the vaca-
200. Id. at 1310-11.
201. Id. at 1311. Judge Tang reasoned that "ERISA heavily regulated pension funds."
Id. The dissent compared the statutory requirements imposed on pension benefit plans by
ERISA with those imposed on welfare benefit plans. ERISA requires "extensive reporting
and disclosure requirements, minimum plan standards for participant eligibility and vesting,
minimum funding standards, and standards of conduct for persons who serve in a fiduciary
capacity to a plan." Id. A welfare benefit plan must only comply with "the reporting and
disclosure requirements and the fiduciary responsibility standards." Id.
202. Id. Judge Tang reasoned that even if § 206(d)(1) was found to apply to welfare
benefit plans, it was unlikely that § 206(d)(1) preempted state levying statutes by its own
force. Section 206(d)(1) does not address either levies or attachments and in the past when
Congress wanted to preempt such statutes, it did so through express statutory language. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1312.
205. Id. The dissent reasoned that by using the word regulate in § 514 definitions
"suggests that the section was not designed to preempt state laws having only a tangential,
non-regulatory effect on benefits plans." Id. Judge Tang stated that "had that been the
design, less restrictive words such as 'affect', 'influence', or 'connected with' would have
been" used as an alternative, or "benefit plan administrators would have been given blanket
immunity from the application of state law." Id.
206. Id. Judge Tang concluded that the state statute only sought to "secure payment
of delinquent taxes and treat[ed] trust funds as" another means to "achieve this aim." Id.
The statute, the dissent asserted, did not "regulate, directly or indirectly, plan reporting,




tion trust fund.207 The dissent reasoned that the only "regulatory
effect" identified by the trustees was the administrative burden as-
sociated with processing levy notices, and that was too minor to be
considered "regulatory."210
The majority in Mackey correctly held that section 18-4-22.1 of
the Georgia garnishment statute was preempted by ERISA section
514(a). The majority relied on Shaw, Metropolitan Life, and Pilot
Life to hold that section 18-4-22.1, which singled out employee
welfare benefit plans covered under ERISA for different treatment
under Georgia's garnishment procedures, was preempted. 0 9 Under
the Georgia garnishment statutes, ERISA welfare benefit plans
were protected from garnishment, but non-ERISA plans were not
protected from garnishment under Georgia law.2 10 Because of its
precedent in this area, the Supreme Court had taken it for granted
that section 514(a) preempted state laws which were "specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans." '' The dissent agreed
with the majority that section 18-4-22.1 was preempted under sec-
tion 514(a).212
Although the purpose of the Georgia legislature might have been
to further ERISA's underlying policies, based on the legislative
history, the majority, by preempting section 18-4-22.1, properly
upheld the broad preemptive reach of section 514(a). Preemption
of section 18-4-22.1 eliminated the threat of state or local regula-
tion that might have conflicted with the regulation of ERISA gov-
erned welfare benefit plans. Through its decisions in Alessi, Shaw,
Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a body of federal substantive law establishing when a state
law or regulation which deals with rights under private welfare and
pension plans is preempted by ERISA. This is in accord with what
Congress intended when enacting section 514(a) of ERISA, as ex-
pressed by Senators Williams and Javits. 3
The majority's decision that Georgia's entire garnishment proce-
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185 (1988).
210. Id. at 2185 n.4.
211. Id. at 2185.
212. Id. at 2191.
213. 120 CONG. REc. 29,917, 29,933, 29,942 (1974). Senator Williams commented that §
514 would eliminate the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. Id. at 29,933. Senator Javits commented that it was intended that
the courts would develop a body of federal substantive law to deal with issues concerning
private welfare and pension plans. Id. at 29,917, 29,942.
1989
Duquesne Law Review
dure was not preempted by ERISA, thereby allowing the garnish-
ment of a participant's benefits in an ERISA welfare benefit plan,
followed the virtually unanimous view of federal and state courts
that had decided this issue.2 ' Like the trust funds in the Missouri
state court case, Electrical Workers, and in the federal court case,
Local 212 IBEW,"I the trustees in Mackey argued unsuccessfully
that the Georgia garnishment laws "related to" their ERISA gov-
erned welfare benefit plan because compliance with garnishment
orders caused the plan to incur substantial administrative burdens
and costs. 216 The courts have found that this effect on benefit
plans is too minimal to invoke ERISA's preemption provision.
1 7
According to the legislative history, section 514 was the "reserva-
tion to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans."218 However, through its power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans, ERISA does not provide for
the enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans won in
a civil action in accordance with section 502 of ERISA. 219 There-
fore, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), deference has
been given to state law to provide methods for collecting the judg-
ments, and garnishment is one permissible method of collection.220
When ERISA was enacted in 1974, Congress included a spend-
thrift provision, section 206(d)(1). 221 Congress did not enact a pro-
vision barring the assignment or alienation of welfare plan bene-
fits. 2 2  The Mackey majority appropriately concluded that
Congress was aware, as evidenced by section 206(d)(1), that plan
214. 108 S. Ct. at 2186. The majority stated in a footnote that the only court to hold
otherwise was the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Construc-
tion Laborers' Vacation Trust for Southern California, 679 F.2d 1307 (1982), vacated on
other grounds. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). The majority noted, however, that subsequent Ninth Cir-
cuit opinions have held that § 514(a) does not preempt state-law attachments of welfare
benefit plans. 108 S. Ct. at 2186 n.6.
215. 108 S. Ct. 2186. The majority cited these decisions as examples of other courts
that have held that ERISA does not preempt the application of state garnishment proce-
dures to ERISA welfare benefit plans. Id.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Local 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW Credit Union,
549 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd per curiam, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1984); Mackey
v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv. Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2186 (1988).
218. 120 CONG. REC. 29,917 (1974).
219. 108 S. Ct. at 2187.
220. Id.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
222. ERISA § 206(d)(1) specifically provides that pension plan benefits may not be
assigned or alienated. Section 206(d)(1) makes no mention of welfare plan benefits. See 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
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benefits could be garnished.223 In remaining silent on the attach-
ment or garnishment of welfare plan benefits, Congress might well
have intended that such benefits not be precluded from state gar-
nishment laws.
The overall scheme of ERISA favoring the protection of pension
plan benefits, but not welfare plan benefits, was furthered in 1984
when Congress enacted the REA. According to the senate report,
Congress found it necessary to create a limited exception to the
spendthrift provision of ERISA to clarify and provide guidance to
the courts as to the circumstances under which state family prop-
erty decrees are not preempted under ERISA.224 The senate report
discussed pension, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans through-
out without mentioning welfare benefit plans.225 Under the REA,
section 206(d) was amended to allow for the assignment or aliena-
tion of pension benefits through a qualified domestic relations or-
der, and section 514(b)(7) was added to save such order from pre-
emption. 26 When Congress proposed the REA amendments, it had
the opportunity to clarify ERISA with respect to the garnishment
of welfare benefit plans outside the scope of family property de-
crees, and apparently chose not to do so.
The majority construed congressional action in 1984 as cor-
recting an error made by the courts that domestic relation orders
are preempted by ERISA, thereby clarifying the original meaning
of section 514(a).227 The majority took the position that the intent
of the Congress that originally enacted ERISA was controlling and
that the Supreme Court had to look at the structure and intent of
ERISA in 1974, not 1984.228 The dissent disagreed and maintained
the view that when Congress enacted a limited exception to pre-
emption in 1984, it was reflecting a positive expression of legisla-
tive will. 229 The Supreme Court, the dissent argued, was bound to
give effect to the intent of Congress in 1984.230
However, the 1984 amendments to ERISA deal with the spend-
thrift provision of ERISA. 21 This reflects congressional concern
223. 108 S. Ct. at 2189.
224. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2565.
225. Id. at 2564-69.
226. Id.
227. 108 S. Ct. at 2191.
228. Id. at 2190.
229. Id. at 2192.
230. Id.
231. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
1989
Duquesne Law Review
over the proper distribution of a participant's pension plan bene-
fits, and also reflects the reality of a changing society that regards
the family relationship as an economic partnership. The REA
amendments provide for a participant's pension benefits to be as-
signed to a spouse, former spouse, or other dependent, not a com-
mercial creditor of the participant. 32 The spendthrift provision
specifically prohibits pension benefits from assignment or aliena-
tion with no mention of welfare plan benefits. It follows then that
if a participant can assign or alienate his welfare plan benefits
without violating a provision of ERISA, those benefits might be
subject to the claims of that participant's creditors.
A greater need for litigation and federal court intervention has
resulted from the lack of guidance in ERISA's provisions on the
preemption of welfare benefit plans. In deciding not to preempt
state law attachment or garnishment of welfare benefit plans, the
courts seem to be in conflict with the congressional findings and
declaration of policy enunciated in section 1(a) of ERISA.233 Gar-
nishment of participants' welfare benefits deprives them of antici-
pated benefits, affects their continued well-being and security, and
impairs their general welfare. However, in spite of court decisions
allowing garnishment of welfare plan benefits pursuant to state
laws, Congress has not clarified ERISA through legislation to de-
termine the boundaries of state and local regulation with respect to
welfare benefit plans. Perhaps this congressional silence is an indi-
cation that Congress agrees with the courts' interpretation of
ERISA's preemption provision. If so, the silence will continue until
Congress feels compelled to correct the courts' error by amending
ERISA to specifically prohibit garnishment of welfare plan
benefits.
Leah Davis
ADMIN. NEws 2547, 2564-69.
232. Id.
233. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
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